Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking by De Brigard, Felipe et al.
 
Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of
episodic counterfactual thinking
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation De Brigard, Felipe, Donna R. Addis, Jaclyn H. Ford, Daniel L.
Schacter, and Kelly S. Giovanello. In Press. Remembering what
could have happened: neural correlates of episodic counterfactual
thinking. Neuropsychologia.
Published Version doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015
Accessed February 19, 2015 12:03:37 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10861137
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP  1 
Running Head: Remembering what could have happened 
 
Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual 
thinking 
 
(In press) Neuropsychologia 
 
De Brigard, F
1,2 *, Addis, D.R.
3,4, Ford, J.H.
1, Schacter, D.L.
2, & Giovanello, K.S
1, 5. 
 
1 Department of Psychology – UNC, Chapel Hill 
2 Department of Psychology – Harvard University 
3 School of Psychology – The University of Auckland 
4 Centre for Brain Research – The University of Auckland 
5 Biomedical Research Imaging Center – UNC, Chapel Hill 
 
* Corresponding author: 
 
Felipe De Brigard 
Postdoctoral Fellow 
Department of Psychology 
Harvard University 
William James Hall, 884 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
Cell Phone: (919) 259 8114 
Work: (617) 496 5909 
E-mail: brigard@wjh.harvard.edu  2 
Abstract 
Recent evidence suggests that our capacities to remember the past and to imagine 
what might happen in the future largely depend on the same core brain network that 
includes  the  middle  temporal  lobe,  the  posterior  cingulate/retrosplenial  cortex,  the 
inferior  parietal  lobe,  the  medial  prefrontal  cortex,  and  the  lateral  temporal  cortex. 
However, the extent to which regions of this core brain network are also responsible for 
our capacity to think about what could have happened in our past, yet did not occur (i.e., 
episodic  counterfactual  thinking),  is  still  unknown.  The  present  study  examined  this 
issue. Using a variation of the experimental recombination paradigm (Addis et al., 2009), 
participants were asked both to remember personal past events and to envision alternative 
outcomes to such events while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. Three 
sets of analyses were performed on the imaging data in order to investigate two related 
issues. First, a mean-centered spatiotemporal partial least square (PLS) analysis identified 
a  pattern  of  brain  activity  across  regions  of  the  core  network  that  was  common  to 
episodic  memory  and  episodic  counterfactual  thinking.  Second,  a  non-rotated  PLS 
analysis identified two different patterns of brain activity for likely and unlikely episodic 
counterfactual  thoughts,  with  the  former  showing  significant  overlap  with  the  set  of 
regions  engaged  during  episodic  recollection.  Finally,  a  parametric  modulation  was 
conducted to explore the differential engagement of brain regions during counterfactual 
thinking,  revealing  that  areas  such  as  the  parahippocampal  gyrus  and  the  right 
hippocampus were modulated by the subjective likelihood of counterfactual simulations. 
These results suggest that episodic counterfactual thinking engages regions that form the 
core brain network, and also that the subjective likelihood of our counterfactual thoughts 
modulates the engagement of different areas within this set of regions.   3 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, the notion of episodic memory has been used in reference to the 
psychological capacity to remember the past (Tulving, 1985). As a result, most research 
on  episodic  memory  has  focused  on  episodic  recollection:  the  cognitive  process  of 
bringing  past  experiences  back  to  mind  (Tulving,  2002).  However,  recent  evidence 
suggests striking commonalities between the cognitive and neural processes required to 
remember one’s past and those required to imagine one’s future (for recent reviews, see 
Schacter,  Addis,  &  Buckner,  2008;  Schacter,  Addis,  Hassabis,  Martin,  Spreng,  & 
Szpunar, 2012; Szpunar, 2010). Evidence from three lines of research supports this claim. 
First,  neuropsychological  studies  with  populations  known  to  have  episodic  memory 
deficits, such as patients with amnesia (Tulving, 1985; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; but see 
Squire,  van  der  Horst,  McDuff,  Frascino,  Hopkins  et  al.,  2010),  severe  depression 
(Dickson & Bates, 2005; Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose et al., 1996), schizophrenia 
(D’Argembeau,  Raffard,  &  Van  der  Linden,  2008),  Alzheimer’s  disease  (Addis, 
Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009) and mild cognitive impairment (Gamboz, De 
Vito,  Brandimonte,  Pappalardo,  Galone  et  al.,  2010)  show  that  they  also  exhibit 
impairments when mentally simulating events that may happen in their future, a cognitive 
process that has come to be known as episodic future thinking (Atance & O’Neil, 2001; 
Szpunar, 2010). Similar parallels between remembering the past and imagining the future 
have been observed in young children (Atance & O’Neil, 2001; Suddendorf & Busby, 
2005) as well as in healthy old adults (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Addis, Musicaro, 
Pan, and Schacter, 2010; Gaesser, Sacchetti, Addis, & Schacter, 2011; Spreng & Levine,   5 
2006).  Second,  behavioral  studies  examining  the  phenomenological  characteristics  of 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking indicate that both processes are supported 
by  common  cognitive  mechanisms  (D’Argembeau  &  Van  der  Linden,  2004; 
D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Collette, Van del Linden et al., 2009; Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008). Third, functional neuroimaging studies comparing episodic memory 
and future thinking have revealed a common “core” brain network that is engaged during 
both  processes  (Addis,  Wong,  Schacter,  2007;  Addis  &  Schacter,  2008;  Hassabis, 
Kumara, & Maguire, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Okuda, Fujii, Ohtake, 
Tsukiura, Tanki et al., 2003). This core network, which overlaps substantially with the 
default network (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008), involves primarily the 
medial temporal lobes (including the hippocampus), the cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, 
the inferior parietal lobe, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the lateral temporal cortex 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007).  
To  account  for  the  phenomenological,  neural  and  cognitive  commonalities 
between remembering one’s past and imagining one’s future, Schacter and Addis (2007) 
put forth the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, 
episodic future thinking relies on much the same neural mechanisms, and shares much of 
the same phenomenological characteristics, as episodic memory because both cognitive 
operations depend on similar processes. When we remember an event, episodic memory 
processes  reintegrate  representational  contents  from  the  encoded  experience  to 
reconstruct the unified mental simulation we call recollection. Similarly, when we engage 
in episodic future thinking, some of the same processes recombine components from past 
experiences into a novel, yet memory-dependent, simulation of what may occur in the   6 
future. However, the finding of common activations during both processes is consistent 
with  an  alternative  hypothesis:  Thinking  about  the  future  need  not  involve  the 
recombination of components, but rather, may entail the mere recasting of a previous 
experience as a future event. By this “recasting” account, thinking about the future would 
consist  of  a  two-fold  process:  An  initial  recollection  of  a  specific  past  experience, 
followed by imagining that experience occurring not in the past, but in the future. Thus, 
recasting could explain why brain regions related to episodic memory are engaged during 
episodic  future  thinking,  without  postulating  the  flexible  recombination  of  episodic 
components, as suggested by the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.   
  In a recent study, Addis and collaborators (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 
2009)  tested  the  constructive  episodic  simulation  hypothesis  as  an  alternative  to  the 
recasting view using an experimental recombination procedure. This paradigm consists 
of collecting episodic memories from participants in order to extract details from the 
reported episodes. Such event details or components are subsequently recombined during 
a scanning session in which they are employed as visual cues. Addis and colleagues 
presented participants with three components (i.e., person, object and place) extracted 
from  participants’  memories.  In  one  condition,  all  components  belonged  to  the  same 
memory  and  participants  were  simply  asked  to  remember  the  event  to  which  such 
episodic  details  belonged.  In  a  second  condition,  participants  were  presented  with 
randomly recombined components of their memories and were asked to imagine a future 
event that would include such event details. Finally, in a third condition, participants 
were presented with randomly recombined components of their reported memories, but 
were asked to imagine an alternative past event including such disjoint event details.   7 
Using spatiotemporal partial least squares analysis (PLS), Addis, Pan et al. (2009) found 
that all three conditions commonly activated regions of the core brain network. They 
interpreted this result as supporting the constructive simulation hypothesis, as opposed to 
the  recasting  account,  insofar  as  the  experimental  procedure  required  episodic 
recombination  of  elements  into  imagined  future  and  past  events.  Specifically,  they 
suggest that this common activation may reflect the retrieval of episodic contents—a 
process  that  is  necessary  not  only  when  remembering  past  events,  but  also  when 
constructing imagined future or past events through a process of recombination.  
Importantly, in addition to finding evidence in support of the overlap between 
remembering and imagining, Addis, Pan et al. (2009) found two distinguishable patterns 
of brain activity within this shared neural network. The spatiotemporal PLS analysis also 
identified one subsystem within the core brain network that was preferentially associated 
with  the  remembering  task,  and  another  subsystem  preferentially  associated  with  the 
future and past imagining tasks. However, Addis, Pan et al. (2009) did not examine an 
essential feature of simulations of what may happen in the future and what may have 
happened  in  the  past:  the  subjective  likelihood  of  those  events.  Namely,  when 
prospecting, we usually simulate episodes of what we think is likely or probable to occur 
to us in the future (Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010). Similarly, we entertain thoughts 
about  alternative  past  events  that  we  consider  more  or  less  likely  to  have  happened. 
However,  as  Addis,  Pan  et  al.  (2009)  point  out  in  their  discussion,  by  randomly 
recombining episodic details taken from multiple memories, participants may have been 
presented with possible, yet quite unlikely past events that otherwise would have never 
occurred to them. As such, it remains unclear what are the precise neural mechanisms   8 
underlying our capacity to simulate alternative versions of specific past personal episodes 
that  could  have  happened  but  did  not  actually  occur—a  cognitive  process  we  call 
episodic counterfactual thinking (De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012). 
 It  is  worth  noting  that,  although  research  on  the  cognitive  neuroscience  of 
counterfactual thinking—broadly defined as thoughts of what may have been (Roese, 
1997; Byrne, 2002; Epstude & Roese, 2008)—is growing, most studies focus on the 
simulation  of  counterfactual  alternatives  to  impersonal  events  and/or  decision-making 
tasks confined to lab settings, and only a handful have employed stimuli extracted from 
the  participant’s  own  episodic  autobiographical  recollections.  In  one  such  study,  De 
Brigard,  Szpunar,  and  Schacter  (in  press)  asked  participants  to  remember  negative, 
positive,  and  neutral  autobiographical  memories,  and  then  simulate  self-generated 
counterfactual alternatives to those memories once or four times. Repeated simulation 
decreased  the  perceived  plausibility  of  the  episodic  counterfactual  events.  In  a 
neuropsychological  study,  Beldarrain  and  colleagues  (Beldarrain,  Garcia-Monco, 
Astigarraga,  Gonzalez,  &  Grafman,  2005),  compared  spontaneous  versus  non-
spontaneous generation of episodic counterfactual thoughts in patients with prefrontal 
damage. Although previous studies of counterfactual thinking have shown that the medial 
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices are critical for counterfactual thinking in decision 
making tasks (Barbey, Krueger, & Grafman, 2009), Beldarrain et al. (2005) provided 
evidence to the effect that only spontaneous episodic counterfactual thinking is impaired 
in patients with prefrontal damage. More recently, Van Hoeck and collaborators (Van 
Hoeck, Ma, Ampe, Baetens, Vandekerckhove, et al., in press; see also Van Hoeck, Ma, 
Van  Overwalle,  &  Vandekerckhove  2010),  asked  participants  to  either  simulate  past   9 
autobiographical  events,  possible  future  events  or  positive  episodic  counterfactual 
thoughts (or “upward counterfactuals”, i.e., thoughts about how negative outcomes may 
have been better) while undergoing fMRI. Their results showed that, when compared 
with past and future simulations, episodic counterfactual thinking engaged prefrontal, 
inferior parietal, and left temporal cortices.  
  The present study contributes to the nascent literature on episodic counterfactual 
thinking by extending the findings of Addis, Pan et al. (2009) in three novel directions. 
First,  by  directly  comparing  brain  activity  associated  with  autobiographical  memory 
versus  neutral,  positive  (“upward”)  and  negative  (or  “downward”)  episodic 
counterfactual  thinking  using  spatiotemporal  PLS,  the  present  study  allowed  us  to 
identify similarities and differences between regions of the core brain network associated 
with  episodic  counterfactual  thinking  and  autobiographical  recollection.  Second,  by 
manipulating outcome valence of actual episodic autobiographical events, the present 
study permitted us to explore similarities and differences in brain activity for positive, 
negative,  and  neutral  episodic  counterfactual  simulations.  Finally,  since  estimates  of 
subjective likelihood were collected during the scans, we were able to compare brain 
activity associated with possible counterfactual events that were deemed as likely versus 
unlikely by the participants themselves. 
To  this  end,  the  current  study  employed  a  variation  of  the  experimental 
recombination  paradigm  used  by  Addis,  Pan  and  collaborators  in  their  2009  study. 
During a pre-scan interview, participants recalled specific episodes in which something 
that  they  did,  or  that  happened  to  them,  resulted  either  in  a  positive  or  a  negative 
outcome.  Later,  during  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI),  participants   10 
performed four tasks: (1) Remembered a reported autobiographical episode (Remember 
condition), (2) Imagined what would have happened if a reported event whose outcome 
was negative had yield instead a positive outcome (Positive condition), (3) Imagined 
what would have happened if a reported event whose outcome was positive had yield 
instead a negative outcome (Negative condition), and (4) Imagined an alternative way in 
which the experienced outcome could have been brought about by changing a peripheral 
detail  of  the  event  (Peripheral  condition).  Thus,  the  peripheral  condition  involved 
episodic counterfactual thinking, while keeping fixed the outcome valence of the original 
autobiographical event. 
Three  sets  of  data  analyses  were  performed  to  investigate  three  distinct,  yet 
related questions. The first question concerned whether or not episodic counterfactual 
thinking engages regions of the core brain network. In agreement with previous research 
suggesting  that  this  network  is  involved  in  the  creation  of  self-relevant  mental 
simulations  (Buckner  &  Carroll,  2007;  Hassabis  &  Maguire,  2009;  Kurczek,  Duff, 
Jensen,  Adolphs,  Cohen  et  al.,  2010),  we  hypothesized  significant  overlap  between 
regions recruited during episodic autobiographical recollection and those recruited during 
episodic counterfactual thinking. Specifically, we expected to find common recruitment 
of core brain network regions such as the medial temporal lobe, the prefrontal cortex, and 
the precuneus and cingulate cortices in the parietal lobe (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009).  
The  second  question  concerned  whether  or  not  there  are  neural  differences 
between  the  experimental  conditions,  that  is,  between  remembering  and  episodic 
counterfactual thinking, and also among the different forms of counterfactual simulations. 
As  to  regions  preferentially  recruited  during  recollection  relative  to  episodic   11 
counterfactual thinking, we expect to find greater activation in areas associated with the 
remembering subsystem identified by Addis, Pan et al (2009), such as posterior visual 
cortices, medial prefrontal cortices, and medial temporal lobe. In contrast, when it comes 
to regions preferentially associated with episodic counterfactual thinking, we expect to 
find  activation  in  inferior  parietal  lobe,  right  temporal  pole  and  left  middle  temporal 
gyrus, which is consistent with the results reported by Van Hoeck et al. (2010; in press). 
However, since—to the best of our knowledge—the present study constitutes the first 
attempt at manipulating outcome valence during episodic (as opposed to non-episodic) 
counterfactual thinking, there is little basis for advancing specific hypotheses as to which 
regions  would  be  activated.  At  most,  based  upon  previous  results  in  the  cognitive 
neuroscience of counterfactual thinking in general (Barbey et al, 2009), we expect to see 
differential  activations  in  orbitofrontal  cortex  for  positive  and  negative  relative  to 
peripheral counterfactuals. 
Finally, the third question concerned whether or not there are neural differences 
between  the  regions  engaged  during  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts  rated  by 
participants  as  likely  versus  those  rated  as  unlikely.  In  their  study,  Addis,  Pan  and 
collaborators (2009) hypothesized that simulations requiring more imaginative work—
such as imagining an unlikely alternative past event—may demand more combinatorial 
processing than simulations of likely alternative pasts. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
Weiler et al. (2010) showed that activity in right anterior hippocampus increased as a 
function  of  how  subjectively  unlikely  simulated  future  events  were  perceived.  
Accordingly, we hypothesized a similar recruitment of medial temporal areas for likely 
relative to unlikely episodic counterfactual thoughts.    12 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
Participants. Seventeen healthy young adults (M = 21.88; SD = 3.91; range = 18 – 30; 8 
female) were recruited from the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill (UNC-CH). 
Participants were right-handed, native English speakers, and had no history of psychiatric 
or neurological disorders. Participants were recruited using flyers posted on campus, and 
gave written consent according to the requirements of the UNC-CH Institutional Review 
Board.  Participants  received  monetary  compensation.  Due  to  a  software  error  in  the 
recording of ratings, data from the first two subjects were excluded from the non-rotated 
PLS and parametric modulation analyses. The mean-centered PLS analysis included data 
from all seventeen participants. 
 
Pre-scan Stimulus Collection Interview. Approximately eight days (M = 8.41; SD = 
1.84) prior to the scanning session, participants completed a pre-scan stimulus collection 
interview. They were asked to report 100 specific autobiographical memories prompted 
by a list of nouns adapted from Clark and Paivio (2004). They were instructed to report 
only event specific memories—i.e., vividly detailed recollections of single experienced 
events—as opposed to lifetime period or general event memories (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce,  2000);  to  facilitate  adherence  to  this  instruction,  examples  of  each  kind  of 
autobiographical  memory  were  given.  One  interviewer  and  one  assistant  interviewed 
each  participant.  When  presented  with  a  word  (e.g.,  “horse”),  participants  reported  a 
particular event that occurred to them at a determinate place and time (e.g., “Last summer 
I went horseback riding with my sister in Virginia”), and that had a specific immediate   13 
outcome (e.g., “I fell off my horse”). All reported events were less than ten years old. 
Participants were asked to rate the emotional valence of each memory from 1 (“Negative 
Memory”) to 5 (“Positive Memory”).  
 
Stimuli. From the reported memories collected during the interview, seventy-two were 
selected for stimuli. These memories were selected on the basis of two criteria. First, 
memories that were deemed by the two interviewers as most detailed and concrete were 
chosen. Second, the memories whose outcomes were most feasible to swap for alternative 
scenarios, in order to create episodic counterfactual events, were chosen. The alternative 
outcome  creating  the  counterfactual  scenario  was  suggested  by  one  interviewer,  and 
agreed  upon  by  the  second  interviewer.  If  there  was  disagreement  (that  is,  if  an 
interviewer  suggested  an  alternative  outcome  the  second  interviewer  deemed 
implausible), the memory was discarded. Sixty-four of these memories were used for the 
experimental sessions and the remaining eight for a practice session. One fourth of these 
memories  were  positive  memories  (scores  of  4  and  5),  one  fourth  were  negative 
memories (scores of 1 and 2), and the remaining half were neutral (receiving a score of 
3). Three components were extracted from each memory. The context component was the 
place  and  time  of  the  reported  situation  (e.g.,  “Last  summer,  Virginia”).  The  action 
component  was  the  particular  action  or  event  the  participant  reported  (e.g.,  “Horse 
riding”). The outcome component was the immediate effect occurring as a result of the 
reported  action  (e.g.,  “Fell  off  horse”).  For  the  control  task  (see  below),  in  which 
participants  mentally  constructed  a  sentence  comparing  sizes  of  different  objects,  we 
included thirty nouns referring to concrete, emotionally neutral, and imaginable objects.   14 
Although the initial list was based on Clark and Paivio norms (Clark & Paivio, 2004), the 
final list included some new nouns, as extensive piloting showed that participants had 
very little difficulty making judgments of relative sizes among the items in the original 
list. Therefore, the final lists included objects for which judgments of relative sizes were 
not produced as rapidly. This procedure equated the means of the reaction times for the 
control condition with that of the experimental conditions (see Results). 
 
Experimental tasks. In the MRI scanner, participants completed four experimental tasks: 
Remember, Positive, Negative, and Peripheral. All tasks had the same structure (Figure 
1).  Participants  were  presented  with  a  screen  headed  by  the  name  of  the  task  (e.g., 
“Remember”), and three components: Context, action, and outcome of the event. In the 
remember task participants were presented with three components of the same neutral 
memory, and they were asked to remember the cued event. They were instructed to press 
a button as soon as they retrieved the event (i.e., at the end of the construction period). 
Since the components appeared on the screen for a total of ten seconds, participants were 
asked  to  elaborate  on  the  event  for  any  remaining  time.  In  the  positive  condition, 
participants were also presented with three components, except that only the context and 
the  action  components  were  taken  from  the  same  reported  negative  memory.  The 
outcome component was changed to be different from the reported one, in that it offered 
an alternative positive outcome to what actually happened. For example, if the participant 
reported a memory in which her dog underwent an unsuccessful surgery and had to be 
put to sleep, the outcome was changed to suggest that the surgery was successful and the 
dog recovered. A screen with the context, action and counterfactual positive component   15 
appeared for ten seconds, and participants were instructed to press a button as soon as 
they  had  conjured  up  a  counterfactual  thought  of  this  possible  event.  They  were 
instructed to elaborate on that thought for the remaining time. The negative condition was 
similar to the positive condition, except that the context and action components were 
extracted from a positive memory, and the outcome was changed to be negative rather 
than positive. For instance, if a participant reported having won an important game of 
chess, the outcome was changed to suggest that she had lost. Finally, in the peripheral 
condition, the context and the outcome of the event were both extracted from the same 
neutral memory, but a peripheral detail of the action component was changed to suggest 
an alternative way in which the reported outcome could have occurred. For example, if a 
person  reported  running  into  her  sister  (outcome)  while  having  dinner  (action)  at  a 
restaurant  the  previous  week  (context),  participants  were  instructed  to  imagine  that 
instead of dinner, they were having lunch at the same restaurant. 
    Following the presentation of the components, participants were presented with 
four  ratings.  The  first  two  ratings  referred  to  the  emotion  and  the  vividness  of  their 
current mental experience. In the emotion rating, participants were asked to rate their 
current emotion from -2 (Negative) to 2 (Positive). In the vividness rating, participants 
were asked to rate how vivid the memory or their counterfactual thought appeared to 
them from -2 (Low vividness) to 2 (High vividness). The order of these two ratings was 
randomized  across  trials.  Following  a  fixation  cross,  another  set  of  two  ratings  were 
presented that referred to the contents of their memories or counterfactual thoughts—that 
is, what these mental states were about. In the regret/relief rating, participants were asked 
to rate how regretful (-2) or relieved (2) they felt for having experienced that particular   16 
event (for the remember task), or how regretful or relieved they would have felt had the 
outcome turned out as suggested in the screen, as opposed to how it actually happened 
(for the positive, negative, and peripheral tasks). In the likelihood rating, participants 
were asked to evaluate how unlikely (-2) or likely (2) it was that the reported event had 
occurred.  This  likelihood  rating  was  clarified  for  each  experimental  task.  For  the 
remember task, participants were asked to rate the likelihood of the event in terms of its 
ordinariness, with ordinary outcomes (e.g., getting food poisoning from eating expired 
food) being described as more likely than extraordinary events (e.g., sitting next to a 
celebrity at the movie theatre). For the positive and negative tasks, participants were 
asked to rate how likely is it that the event would have occurred with the suggested 
outcome as opposed to the outcome that actually happened. Finally, in the peripheral 
task, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that the experienced outcome would 
have been brought about as suggested by the alternative action as opposed to how it 
actually happened. Although the likelihood and regret/relief ratings for the remembering 
condition  differ  in  meaning  from  the  counterfactual  conditions,  such  ratings  were 
included  as  control  ratings  and  will  not  be  further  analyzed  here.  The  order  to  the 
regret/relief and likelihood ratings was randomized across trials. Each rating screen was 
shown for six seconds, for a total of twelve seconds per set of two trials. Jittered fixation 
crosses (mean duration, 4 seconds; range 2-6 seconds) were presented prior to, between, 
and after rating sets (see Figure 1). 
 
Control  task.  To  control  for  semantic,  visual,  and  motor-related  activity  in  the 
experimental tasks, the same control task employed by Addis and collaborators (Addis,   17 
Pan et al., 2009) was included. In this control task, participants were presented with a 
slide containing three nouns. They were asked to reflect on the physical sizes of the 
objects referred to by those nouns, and then to mentally construct a sentence of the form 
“X is smaller than Y is smaller than Z”, where X, Y, and Z represent the objects referred 
by the displayed nouns. They were asked to press a button as soon as they had covertly 
said the sentence to themselves. The slide with the three words was presented for ten 
seconds. To keep the same sequence as the experimental tasks, the same ratings used in 
those  tasks  were  included  after  the  slide  containing  the  nouns.  Participants  were 
instructed to press a button once the rating appeared, while elaborating on the semantic 
definitions  of  the  words.  As  such,  this  task  controlled  for  similar  processes  as  those 
recruited  during  autobiographical  simulation:  the  retrieval  and  manipulation  of 
information during construction, a task-completion decision, a motor response, and the 
subsequent visuo-spatial and semantic elaboration that occurs during the elaboration of 
mental simulations. 
 
Scanning  session.  Immediately  prior  to  scanning,  the  experimental  and  control  tasks 
were explained to the participants, and they performed a practice session on a laptop 
computer to familiarize them with the tasks and the ratings. In the scanner, participants 
completed eight runs with eleven randomized trials per run. Each run included two trials 
of the remember task, two of the positive task, two of the negative task, two of the 
peripheral task, and three control trials. Across runs, a total of 16 remember, 16 positive, 
16  negative,  16  peripheral,  and  24  control  trials  were  presented.  Each  run  was  518 
seconds long. Images were acquired in a Siemens Magnetom 3T TIM Trio MRI scanner.   18 
Participants’ heads were held in place using cushions and a headrest. An initial localizing 
scan was followed by high resolution sagittal and coronal T1 weighted structural scans 
for anatomic visualization (160 x 1 mm slices, TR=1750 ms, TE=4.38 ms), and a field 
map.  After  these  structural  scans,  functional  scans  were  collected  during  the  eight 
experimental runs using a whole brain, gradient-echo, echo planar sequence (TR = 2 s; 
TE = 23; FOV = 192 mm; Matrix Size = 64 x 64; Flip Angle = 80). Interleaved slices (35 
x 5 mm slices with no skip) were acquired at an angle perpendicular to the long axis of 
the hippocampus, as identified using the T1 structural scan. Stimuli were projected in 
black letters over a white background on a screen that participants could see on a mirror 
placed on the head coil. E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, 
PA) was used for stimulus presentation and to collect behavioral data. Responses were 
made on a five button MR-compatible response box. 
 
Data analysis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA), t-tests and Pearson’s correlations were 
used to analyze reaction times and ratings. Functional MRI data were preprocessed using 
SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) implemented in 
MATLAB  (Mathworks,  Natick,  MA).  Images  were  re-oriented,  slice-time  corrected, 
realigned  and  unwarped,  normalized  to  the  Montreal  Neurological  Institute  (MNI) 
template (resampled at 2 x 2 x 2mm voxels) and spatially smoothed using a 8mm full-
width half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel.  
    Next, two spatiotemporal PLS analyses were performed. First, a hypothesis-free 
mean-centered  analysis  was  conducted  with  a  20-second  temporal  window  (10  TRs). 
Previous similar studies have employed different temporal windows depending on the   19 
length  of  the  trial,  ranging  from  12-seconds  (Addis,  Pan  et  al.,  2009)  to  20-seconds 
(Addis, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; Addis, Knapp, Roberts, & Schacter, 2012). Given the 
length of the trials in the current study (42-seconds), a 20 second (10 TR) window was 
chosen. Each subject’s fMRI data were entered into a data matrix (or datamat) with onset 
times specified as 2000 ms after stimulus onset (to allow for reading of the stimuli). 
Participants’ datamats were then cross-correlated with a matrix of vectors coding for the 
tasks  (design  matrix).  Singular  value  decomposition  is  then  applied  to  reveal  latent 
variables (LVs) that can best account for the most covariance.  Since the number of LVs 
is constrained by the degrees of freedom, four LVs explaining the most covariance were 
identified.  The  statistical  significance  of  each  LV  was  established  by  computing  500 
permutation tests on the singular values to determine the probability that the permutated 
singular value exceeds the singular value of the original latent variable. LVs for which 
the probability is p < .05 are thus considered significant. To identify voxels that reliably 
contributed to each LV, a bootstrap estimation method was computed 300 times. Clusters 
larger  than  100  mm
3  comprising  voxels  with  a  ratio  of  the  salience  to  the  bootstrap 
standard error values (i.e., the “bootstrap ratio”; BSR) greater than 3.2 (p < .0003) are 
reported. PLS identifies whole brain patterns of activity in a single analytic step, thus, no 
correction for multiple comparisons is required. The local maximum for each cluster was 
defined as the voxel with a BSR higher than any other voxel in a 2cm cube centered on 
that voxel.  
    Second,  a  non-rotated  PLS  analysis  was  performed  in  order  to  examine  the 
differences in brain activity between likely and unlikely episodic counterfactual thinking.   20 
Since  we  had  the  a  priori  hypothesis  that  the  pattern  of  brain  activity  for  likely 
counterfactuals would be more similar to that of remember than unlikely counterfactuals, 
a non-rotated analysis allowed us to enter specific contrasts of interest: first, a contrast of 
remember and likely relative to unlikely and control; and second, a contrast of remember, 
likely and unlikely relative to the control task. To that end, we split the trials of both the 
Positive and the Negative conditions into two groups, Likely and Unlikely, according to 
the  participant’s  likelihood  rating.  In  the  likely  condition,  we  included  positive  and 
negative trials to which participants gave a rating of 4 or 5, and in the unlikely condition 
we included those to which participants gave a rating of 1 or 2. All other trials were 
excluded. We then created a datamat with four conditions: remember, likely, unlikely and 
control. As in the mean-centered analysis above, 500 permutations were conducted and 
for each LV a bootstrap estimation was carried out 300 times (BSR = 3.2, p < .0003).  
    Finally, since the non-rotated analysis explained above bins together trials from 
different experimental conditions (i.e., positive and negative counterfactuals) into post-
hoc  likely  and  unlikely  conditions,  it  would  still  be  unclear  whether  brain  activity 
associated  with  each  experimental  condition  is  differentially  influenced  by  ratings  of 
likelihood.  Consequently,  and  based  upon  previous  research  showing  differential 
increases  and  decreases  in  brain  activity  associated  with  perceived  likelihood  during 
episodic future thinking (Weiler et al., 2010), we decided to carry out both negative and 
positive parametric modulations for each experimental condition of the current study. All 
parametric modulations were conducted in SPM8. At the fixed-effects level, condition 
regressors for positive, negative and peripheral counterfactual conditions were specified. 
For each, the likelihood rating was entered as a parametric modulation covariate. Because   21 
vividness ratings showed a significant correlation with likelihood ratings, the ratings for 
vividness were entered as an additional (nuisance) parametric modulation covariate in 
order to isolate the orthogonal contribution of likelihood for the modulation of brain 
activity.  All  covariates  were  modeled  linearly.  For  each  condition,  contrasts  were 
computed to identify regions in which activity was positively or negatively correlated 
with  likelihood;  this  was  done  separately  for  each  condition.  Finally,  at  the  random-
effects level, each set of contrast images (e.g., contrast images from all subjects that 
coded for a positive parametric modulation in a particular condition) were entered into a 
one-sample  t-test  to  determine  which  regions  correlated  with  likelihood  at  the  group 
level.  Following  previous  parametric  modulation  studies  (Rombouts,  Scheltens, 
Machielsen,  Barkhof,  Hoogeraad  et  al,  1999;  Addis,  Moscovitch,  Crawley,  & 
McAndrews, 2004; Addis & Schacter, 2008) a threshold was set for p < .005, k = 10. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Behavioral results.  
    Behavioral results. Only trials for which participants gave a rating are included in 
all analyses. On average, each participant contributed 14.4 (SD=2.13) memories for the 
remember condition, 14.8 (SD=2.17) positive episodic counterfactuals, 14.67 (SD=2.18) 
negative counterfactuals and 14.36 (SD=2.34) peripheral counterfactuals.  
     RTs did not differ across conditions (F(4,80) = .816, p = .52). The mean RTs 
across conditions were as follows: remember M = 4063ms (SD = 956 ms), positive M = 
4331ms (SD = 1170 ms), negative M = 4326ms (SD = 1074 ms), peripheral M = 4512ms 
(SD = 1177 ms), and control M = 4781ms (SD = 1586 ms).    22 
On a 1-to-5 scale for emotion, positive episodic counterfactuals were rated as 
more positive (M = 4.13; SD = .44) than negative (M = 2.88; SD = .044, t(28) = 7.82, p < 
.005; alpha level set at p<.05) and peripheral counterfactuals (M = 3.45; SD = .50, t(28) = 
3.96, p < .005), but they were not significantly different from the remember condition (M 
= 3.91; SD = .45, t(28) = 1.35, p = .18). For vividness, the ratings for remembering (M = 
3.90; SD = .36) were significantly higher than both peripheral (M = 3.46; SD = .48, t(28) 
= 2.88, p < .05) and negative counterfactuals (M = 2.65; SD = .35, t(28) = 9.76, p < .005). 
Likewise, positive counterfactuals were rated as more vivid (M = 4.02; SD = .98) than 
both peripheral (t(28) = 3.16, p < .005) and negative counterfactuals (t(28) = 8.80, p < 
.005). Participants rated the likelihood of negative counterfactuals (M = 2.31; SD = .32) 
as significantly lower than positive (M = 3.62, SD = .50; t(28) = 8.50, p < .005), and 
peripheral counterfactuals (M = 3.24, SD = .52; t(28) = 5.88, p < .005). Finally, for the 
relief/regret ratings, participants tended to say that they would have felt more relieved 
had the outcomes of negative events been positive (M = 3.78; SD = .52) than they would, 
had the outcomes of positive events being negative (M = 2.40; SD = .40; t(28) = 8.06, p < 
.005). The relief/regret ratings for peripheral counterfactuals (M = 3.31; SD = .54) were 
also  significantly  different  from  positive  (t(28)  =  2.53;  p  =  .02)  and  negative 
counterfactuals (t(28) = 6.00; p < .005). Additionally, across counterfactual conditions, 
there  were  strong  and  significant  correlations  between  the  ratings  for  likelihood  and 
vividness (r = .53, p < .001) and also between the ratings for emotion and regret/relief (r 
= .50, p < .001). Finally, there were weak but significant correlations between the ratings 
for emotion and vividness (r = .11, p < .005), and also between the ratings for vividness 
and regret (r = .18, p < .005). No other effects were significant.   23 
Behavioral results related to the non-rotated PLS analysis. As mentioned above, 
for  the  non-rotated  analysis  we  split  the  trials  from  the  positive  and  the  negative 
conditions into two post-hoc conditions, likely and unlikely counterfactuals, according to 
likelihood ratings. Trials that received ratings of 4 and 5 only were included in the likely 
condition,  whereas  trials  that  received  ratings  of  1  and  2  only  were  included  in  the 
unlikely  condition.  All  other  trials  were  excluded.  On  average,  each  participant 
contributed 14.4 (SD = 2.13) episodes for the remembering condition, 11.20 (SD = 3.61) 
for the likely condition, and 12.53 (SD = 3.66) for the unlikely condition. The average 
rating of likelihood for the likely condition was 4.46 (SD = .50) while for the unlikely 
condition was 1.58 (SD = .49). A t-test revealed that these means were significantly 
different (t(167) = 115.7; p < .001).  After the split, the averages for the remaining ratings 
for both groups were as follows. Likely counterfactuals were rated as more positive (M = 
3.68; SD = 1.27), more vivid (M = 4.10; SD = .95) and more relieving (M = 3.28; SD = 
1.40) than unlikely counterfactuals (emotion: M = 3.49; SD = 1.37; vividness: 2.61; SD = 
1.36; regret/relief: M = 2.83; 1.42). In addition to the ratings of likelihood, likely and 
unlikely counterfactuals also differed in their ratings of vividness (t(167) = 48.1; p < 
.001). This result was expected given the correlation reported above. No other effects 
were significant.    
 
3.2. Mean-centered PLS analysis. This analysis identified one significant latent variable 
(LV1;  p  <  .03;  singular  value  =  133.53),  which  explained  52.51%  of  the  crossblock 
covariance. This LV differentiated the remember, positive and negative conditions from 
the  control  condition,  with  the  peripheral  condition  not  contributing  to  the  pattern   24 
(indicated by the error bars for this condition crossing zero; figure 2A). The regions with 
negative saliences (Table 1) were commonly engaged by the remember, positive and 
negative counterfactuals tasks relative to the control task. This neural differentiation was 
evident as early as the second TR (Figure 2B). The set of activated regions (see Tables 1 
and 2, and Figures 2C and 2D) included the bilateral cingulate cortex (BA 23 and 24) and 
superior  temporal  gyri  (BA  38),  as  well  as  right  inferior  frontal  gyrus  (BA  9),  right 
parahippocampal gyrus (BA 28) extending into the hippocampus, right precentral gyrus 
(BA 6), left superior parietal/precuneus (BA 7) and left middle temporal lobe (BA 39 and 
21). As hypothesized, these regions are all part of the core network identified in previous 
studies of remembering and imagining (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008).  
  In addition, and similar to Addis, Pan et al’s (2009) reported results, the laterality 
of some identified regions varied across the duration of the trials. Right regions showed 
activity  only  during  the  first  4  TRs,  after  which,  all  activity  occurred  in  the  left 
hemisphere.  However,  the  laterality  of  some  regions  never  varied.  For  instance,  the 
activity  of  the  posterior  cingulate  cortex  (BA  23)  appeared  in  the  left  hemisphere, 
whereas  the  parahippocampal  gyrus  (BA  28)  and  the  inferior  frontal  gyrus  (BA  9) 
showed only right activations. The laterality of yet other regions shifted over the course 
of the trial. For example, the cerebellum showed left activity during TR 2 but during TR 
4 the activity was in the right hemisphere. Similarly, the precuneus (BA 7) showed right 
activity during TR 3 but it shifted to the left during TR 4. Finally, while the superior 
temporal gyrus (BA 38) was active during most of the trial, its activity was preferentially 
in the left hemisphere, except during TR 4 were it was bilateral.     25 
  Regions with positive saliences were associated with the control condition. These 
regions included bilateral middle frontal gyrus (BA 46 and 10), superior frontal gyrus 
(BA  9  and  8)  and  claustrum,  as  well  as  right  medial  frontal  gyrus  (BA  25),  right 
supramarginal gyrus (BA 40) and left superior temporal gyrus (BA 38).  For brevity, 
regions associated with the control task are not reported in Table 1.  
 
3.3.  Non-Rotated  PLS  analysis.  We  conducted  a  non-rotated  analysis  to  explore 
differences in patterns of brain activity between counterfactuals that were deemed as 
likely or unlikely by the participants, and the retrieved memories from the remembering 
condition  (trials  from  the  counterfactual  conditions  were  binned  into  these  post-hoc 
conditions, as explained above in Section 3.1). This analysis revealed a significant LV 
(LV  2;  p  <  .02;  Singular  Value  167.95),  which  explained  38.26%  of  the  crossblock 
covariance. This LV differentiated activations for remember and likely versus unlikely 
and  control  (positive  versus  negative  salience’s  respectively;  see  tables  2  and  3,  and 
Figure  3).  LV  2  indicates  significant  overlap  in  the  brain  regions  engaged  during 
remembering  and  likely  episodic  counterfactual  thinking,  including  bilateral  inferior 
parietal  lobe  (BA  40),  right  precuneus/superior  parietal  lobule  (BA  7)  and  superior 
temporal gyrus (BA 38), as well as left superior frontal gyrus (BA 9 and 10), middle and 
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45, 46 and 47), middle and inferior temporal gyri (BA 21 and 
22), angular gyrus (BA 39) and parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36). An extensive set of 
regions  were  active  during  unlikely  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts  and  the  control 
condition (Table 3), including bilateral superior frontal gyrus (BA 6, 8 and 9), middle 
frontal gyrus (BA 10 and 11), cingulate (BA 24, 29, 31 and 32), middle temporal gyrus   26 
(BA 22), parahippocampal gyrus (BA 19 and 30), putamen and precuneus. Additionally, 
it included left inferior parietal lobule (BA 40), caudate and insula (BA 13), as well as 
right superior temporal gyrus (BA 42 and 38), parahippocampal gyrus (BA 27), thalamus 
and  hypothalamus.  Of  note,  the  laterality  of  some  of  the  regions  shifted  across  the 
duration of the trial. For instance, the parahippocampal gyrus (BA 19) showed activations 
at TR 3 (4 to 6 seconds after stimulus onset) and then it showed contralateral activation at 
TR 4 (6 to 8 seconds after stimulus onset). Likewise, the middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) 
showed left activity in TR 3, then it showed right activity at TR 5, and then it showed 
bilateral activity at TR 6 (10 to 12 seconds after stimulus onset). 
Of note, the second contrast in this non-rotated analysis showed a strong trend 
toward  differentiating  remember,  likely  and  unlikely  counterfactuals  from  the  control 
condition  (p  =  .06;  Singular  Value  167.84).  Presumably,  this  LV  did  not  reach 
significance because the likely and unlikely conditions included trials from the peripheral 
condition which, as indicated by LV 1, did not contribute to the overall activation of 
regions from the core network.  However, to highlight the similarities between this LV 
(LV  3)  and  LV  1,  the  regions  of  activation  revealed  by  this  LV  are  included  in 
supplementary materials. Finally, to verify that the difference in brain activity patterns 
revealed by LV 2 for likely and unlikely counterfactuals was not driven by the control 
condition,  a  non-rotated  analysis  including  only  remember,  likely,  and  unlikely 
conditions  was  conducted.  This  analysis  revealed  a  significant  LV  (LV  4;  p  <  .05, 
Singular Value 143.0), which explained 39.04% of the crossblock covariance. Although 
some new regions emerged relative to LV2, overall the spatial patterns were overlapping. 
This  result  confirms  that  the  differential  pattern  of  activation  revealed  by  LV  2  was   27 
driven  by  a  difference  in  perceived  likelihood  of  counterfactuals,  rather  than  by  the 
control  condition.  The  regions  of  activation  revealed  by  LV  4  are  included  in  the 
Supplementary Materials.  
 
3.4. Parametric modulation. Results of the parametric modulation analyses are reported 
in  Table  4.  Regions  whose  activity  increased  linearly  as  the  ratings  for  likelihood 
increased  included  left  inferior  and  middle  frontal  gyrus  for  positive  counterfactuals, 
anterior left parahippocampal gyrus and right hippocampus for negative counterfactuals, 
and superior temporal, cingulate and posterior left parahippocampal gyri for peripheral 
counterfactuals. Regions whose activity decreased linearly as the rating for likelihood 
increased  included  thalamus,  superior  temporal  and  right  parahippocampal  gyrus  for 
positive counterfactuals, middle temporal and angular gyrus for negative counterfactuals, 
and post-central and right superior frontal gyrus for peripheral counterfactuals.  
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Behavioral results. Our results indicate that, overall, participants tended to conjure 
up  more  vivid  positive  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts  than  negative  counterfactual 
thoughts. In other words, thoughts about how things could have turned out for the better 
were experienced by participants as more vivid and detailed than thoughts about how 
things  could  have  turned  out  for  the  worse.  This  result  is  consistent  with  previous 
evidence  indicating  that  people  tend  to  remember  their  past,  and  also  simulate  their 
future,  with  a  positivity  bias  (Bower,  1981;  Holmes,  1970;  Meltzer,  1930;  Sharot, 
Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007; Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 2012; Waldfogel, 1948;   28 
Walker  &  Skowronski,  2009;  Wilbur,  Skowronski,  Thomson,  2003).  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  this  positivity  bias  carries  over  to  episodic  counterfactual  thinking. 
Additionally,  participants  thought  that  possible  positive  outcomes  to  experienced 
negative events were more likely than possible negative outcomes to experienced positive 
events. In other words, participants indicated that it was more likely that a negative event 
could  have  had  a  positive  outcome  than  a  positive  event  could  have  had  a  negative 
outcome. This result is also consistent with other well-established evidence on “optimism 
bias”, according to which people tend to overestimate the likelihood of a possible event 
happening over a negative event (Hoch, 1984; Sharot et al., 2007; Weinstein, 1980). The 
fact that episodic counterfactual thinking is subject to biases known to affect episodic 
recollection and future thinking strongly suggests the involvement of shared cognitive 
processes. Finally, the strong correlation between the ratings of vividness and likelihood 
indicates that more likely episodic counterfactual thoughts are experienced more vividly 
and with more detail. From the point of view of the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis, this result suggests that more likely counterfactuals conjure up more episodic 
details than unlikely counterfactuals, which would explain why we experience the former 
more vividly than the latter. 
 
4.2. Episodic counterfactual thinking and the core brain network. The first question 
explored in the present study concerned whether or not episodic counterfactual thinking, 
independent of the subjective experience of likelihood, engages regions of the core brain 
network. Previous research has shown that cognitive tasks involving self-projection—
predominantly autobiographical recollection and episodic future thinking—tend to recruit   29 
a common network of brain regions. Since episodic counterfactual thinking also involves 
self-projection, we hypothesized that this task would also recruit these brain regions as 
well.  The  results  of  the  mean-centered  PLS  analysis  lend  strong  credence  to  this 
hypothesis. The identification of a latent variable (LV 1) differentiating the remembering 
and  the  episodic  counterfactual  tasks  from  the  control  task  suggests  that  there  is 
significant  neural  overlap  between  brain  regions  engaged  during  autobiographical 
recollection and those engaged during episodic counterfactual thinking (Figure 2; see also 
LV 3 in the Supplementary Materials for similar findings). Moreover, essentially all the 
regions associated with the experimental tasks identified by LV 1 are part of the core 
brain  network.  Of  special  interest  is  the  right  medial  temporal  activation  in  TR  2; 
although this cluster peaked in the parahippocampal gyrus, it extended to anterior regions 
of  the  hippocampus  proper  (y  =  -22).  Activation  of  right  hippocampus  and 
parahippocampal  gyrus  during  the  construction  of  episodic  simulations  has  been  a 
consistent result in the episodic memory and future thinking literature (Okuda et al., 
2003; Szpunar et al., 2007, Hassabis et al., 2007; Weiler et al., 2010; Addis et al., 2007, 
2009, 2011). Our results are thus in agreement with these findings, showing that the right 
hippocampus and adjacent regions in the parahippocampal gyrus are recruited during the 
simulation of episodic counterfactual thoughts as well. This pattern of activity is also 
consistent with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, and lends credence the 
claim that right hippocampus may be supporting the relational processing (Schacter & 
Wagner,  1999;  Eichembaum,  2001;  Giovanello,  Schnyer,  &  Verfaellie,  2004;  Chua, 
Rand-Giovennetti, Schacter, Albert, & Sperling, 2007) required to flexibly recombine 
previously encoded memories into novel episodic counterfactual thoughts. More recent   30 
data indicate a role for right hippocampus in encoding future simulations for later recall 
(Martin, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2011), and it is possible that the present findings 
also reflect, to some extent, activity related to the encoding of a novel counterfactual 
simulation into episodic memory. 
The  significant  neural  overlap  between  the  remembering  and  the  episodic 
counterfactual  tasks  also  supports  the  claim  that  the  mechanisms  underlying  episodic 
autobiographical recollection contribute not just to future simulation but to other forms of 
imagination including our capacity to think of alternative ways in which our past could 
have  occurred.  Recent  research  in  the  cognitive  neuroscience  of  decision-making 
provides further evidence in favor of this claim. In studies designed to elicit participants’ 
feelings of regret associated with counterfactual thoughts regarding what would have 
happened  had  they  made  a  different  choice  (e.g.,  regret  gambling  task;  Camille, 
Coricelli,  Sallet,  Pradat-Diehl,  Duhamel  et  al,  2004),  a  consistent  result  is  the 
involvement of critical regions within the core brain network—specifically, the middle 
frontal gyrus, the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the hippocampal 
and parahippocampal regions (e.g., Coricelli, Critchley, Joffily, O’Doherty, Sirigu et al., 
2005; Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007). Additionally, our results are consistent with the 
aforementioned findings by Van Hoeck et al’s (in press; also Van Hoeck et al., 2010) in 
which regions of the core brain network were active while participant’s freely engaged in 
upward episodic counterfactual thinking. Taken together, these results, as well as the 
results from our non-rotated PLS analysis (discussed below), strongly suggest that similar 
neural  mechanisms  underlie  episodic  autobiographical  memory  and  episodic 
counterfactual  thinking  –  particular  when  the  counterfactual  thoughts  are  likely  and   31 
plausible.  Our  capacity  to  imagine  alternative  ways  in  which  our  past  could  have 
occurred appears to involve similar processes to those employed when we think about 
what in fact occurred in our pasts.  
Finally, it should be noted that, although the current study was also designed to 
shed light on whether or not there were differences in brain regions between different 
valenced  counterfactual  simulations,  the  mean-centered  analysis  did  not  yield  a 
significant LV differentiating patterns of activations between such conditions. This result 
could be due to many factors. One possibility is simply lack of power, since the number 
of mental simulations that were emotionally neutral (in the remembering and peripheral 
conditions) were double the number of those that had either a negative or a positive 
valence. Another possibility is that the suggested outcomes used in the manipulation were 
not strong enough to elicit significant emotional effects. As such, future research may 
benefit from using more emotionally loaded stimuli in during counterfactual generation, 
as well as a larger number of observations, in order to clarify the differential contribution 
of the core brain regions in episodic counterfactual thinking. 
 
4.3. Likely versus unlikely episodic counterfactuals thoughts. The current study was 
also designed to investigate neural differences between the regions engaged during likely 
versus  unlikely  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts.  Even  though  participants  were  only 
presented with counterfactual outcomes considered plausible by both interviewers, it is 
still possible that some of those outcomes are not considered plausible or likely by the 
participants  themselves.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  roughly  a  third  of  the  counterfactuals 
suggested  to  the  participants  were  judged  as  unlikely  confirms  this  claim.  The  non-  32 
rotated PLS analysis conducted on the sets of likely and unlikely counterfactual thoughts 
yielded  a  significant  variable,  LV  2,  which  differentiated  between  remembering  and 
likely counterfactuals, on the one hand, and unlikely counterfactuals and control, on the 
other (Figure 3). LV 2 showed substantial overlap in the pattern of regions activated 
during  remembering  and  likely  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts,  suggesting  greater 
involvement  of  the  remembering  subsystem  in  our  capacity  to  think  of  possible  past 
events that we think are more likely to have happened in our past relative to possible past 
events we think are unlikely that could have occurred.  
As mentioned before, Addis, Pan and collaborators (2009) suggested that unlikely 
episodic counterfactual thoughts may require more “imaginative work” than likely ones, 
which in turn would be reflected in greater activation of regions associated with the 
imagining subsystem. Our results partially confirm this prediction. As shown in figure 4 
(included in supplementary materials), simulating unlikely counterfactuals engaged some 
regions of the imagining subsystem, such as the parahippocampal cortex and the inferior 
frontal  gyrus,  to  a  larger  extent  than  does  both  remembering  and  simulating  likely 
counterfactuals.  Similarly,  left  superior  frontal  gyrus  (BA  10)  is  sensitive  to  the 
likelihood  of  counterfactuals,  showing  a  significant  decrease  in  signal  during  the 
construction  of  unlikely  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts  while  remaining  at  baseline 
during  the  construction  phases  in  remembering  and  likely  counterfactual  thinking. 
However, given the substantial overlap between unlikely counterfactuals and the control 
condition  in  LV  2—which,  as  indicated  by  the  temporal  brain  scores  (Figure  3B), 
remained tightly coupled for at least the first 6 TRs—it is unclear whether these processes 
reflect an increase in combinatorial process of episodic details or some other imagination-  33 
related  capacity  also  deployed  during  the  control  task.  Further  research  contrasting 
episodic counterfactual thinking with purely imaginative tasks could help disentangle this 
issue.  
  The  results  of  the  parametric  modulation  analysis  also  shed  light  on  the 
involvement of certain regions of the core brain network—particularly frontal regions, 
the cingulate gyrus, and the medial temporal lobe—during the construction of likely and 
unlikely  counterfactual  simulations.    Increased  likelihood  during  the  construction  of 
positive  or  “upward”  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts—that  is,  thoughts  in  which 
participants  were  instructed  to  change  the  negative  outcome  of  an  actual  personal 
experience  for  an  alternative  positive  one—correlated  with  increased  activity  in  left 
middle and inferior frontal gyrus (BA 10 and 46). Similarly, the increased likelihood of 
negative or “downward” episodic counterfactual thoughts, whereby participants thought 
of alternative negative outcomes to memories of events with actual positive outcomes, 
was also associated with increased activity in middle and inferior frontal gyrus (BA 9, 46 
and 47), but in the right hemisphere. Previous research has shown that some of these 
regions—particularly, BA 10 and 46—are activated during self-referential simulations in 
both episodic memory and episodic future thinking (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 
2007; D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008). These results are also consistent 
with  research  on  counterfactual  thinking  showing  that  medial  prefrontal  cortex  is 
preferentially  active  when  participants  think  about  alternative  scenarios  involving 
themselves  versus  others  (Belderrain  et  al.,  2005),  while  inferior  regions  of  the 
orbitofrontal  cortex—particulary  BA  9,  10  and  47—have  been  found  to  be  involved 
during  upward  and  downward  counterfactual  thinking  (Elliot,  Dolan,  &  Frith,  2000;   34 
Coricelli  et  al.,  2005;  Barbey  et  al.,  2009).  The  results  of  the  present  parametric 
modulation  are  consistent  with  these  observations,  insofar  as  they  show  that  the 
subjective likelihood of both positive and negative episodic counterfactual thoughts—
which  by  definition  are  self-referential—modulate  regions  in  the  prefrontal  cortex 
expected to be engaged by upward and downward counterfactual thoughts about oneself. 
This observation suggests that as the perceived likelihood of our episodic counterfactual 
thoughts increases, the self-referential quality of these simulations might also increase. 
    In  addition  to  frontal  regions,  increases  in  ratings  of  likelihood  for  negative 
counterfactuals were also associated with increased activity in anterior cingulate cortex, 
which has been consistently identified as part of the core brain network (Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; see below). This result is consistent with previous studies showing the 
involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex in general counterfactual thinking (Coricelli 
et al, 2005), as well as episodic simulations irrespective of temporal dimension (Addis et 
al., 2009; D’Argembeau, Xue, Lu, Van del Linden, & Bechara, 2008). Similarly, the 
insula, which has reciprocal connections with the medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortices, has been associated with the regulation of evaluative and affective processes 
(Bertson, Norman, Bechara, Bruss, Tranel et al., 2011). In particular, increases in insula 
activation have been correlated with increases in emotions associated with risk-averse 
behavior, particularly regret (e.g., Xue, Lu, Levin, & Bechara, 2010). However, a recent 
study investigating common and unique neural activations for autobiographical, episodic, 
and  semantic  retrieval,  showed  insula  activation  to  be  preferentially  associated  with 
autobiographical  recollection  (Burinova  &  Grady,  2007).  As  such,  the  positive 
modulation of insula observed in our studies may reflect either the evaluative processes   35 
in  the  emotion  associated  with  likely  episodic  counterfactual  thinking—which  would 
suggest that as the subjective likelihood of our counterfactual thoughts increases so does 
our evaluative affective processing—or the contribution of autobiographical recollection 
to the construction of mental simulations about alternative ways our personal past could 
have been. Further research may be needed to clarify why it is that regions like insula and 
the  anterior  cingulate  cortex  are  differentially  engaged  depending  on  the  emotional 
direction of the counterfactual simulation. Likewise, future research may be able to shed 
light on the fact that subjective likelihood increased activity in more brain regions for 
negative and peripheral counterfactual simulations whereas more brain regions showed 
decreases in activity during positive counterfactual simulations.  
    Of special interest is the incremental activation of regions in the temporal lobe as 
a  function  of  increased  subjective  likelihood  in  negative  and  peripheral  episodic 
counterfactual  thinking.  For  both  negative  and  peripheral  counterfactuals,  likelihood 
positively  modulated  activity  in  bilateral  superior  temporal  (BA  22  and  38)  and  left 
parahippocampal  gyri  (BA  19  and  30),  regions  also  revealed  to  be  associated  with 
remembering and likely counterfactual thoughts in LV 2. In their study of occurrence 
probability for episodic future thinking, Weiler and colleagues (2010) report a positive 
modulation of BA 22 for richness of details. However, in the present study, we controlled 
for vividness and still found BA 22 to be positively modulated by increased subjective 
probability. As such, activity in BA 22 appears to increase during the construction of 
imagined scenarios as a function of their perceived subjective likelihood independently of 
the  richness  of  the  details  with  which  such  scenarios  are  experienced.  Additionally, 
increased subjective probability also modulated activation in the left parahippocampal   36 
gyrus. Activations in this area are common during construction periods in episodic future 
thinking tasks. For example, Szpunar and collaborators (2009) found greater activity in 
parahippocampal  gyrus  during  the  construction  of  possible  future  events  in  familiar 
versus  unfamiliar  settings.  Future  research  could  investigate  whether  the  incremental 
recruitment  of  the  parahippocampal  cortices  in  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts 
perceived as more vivid and likely to have happened is related to the retrieval of familiar 
contexts. 
    As noted above, the increment in activity in right hippocampus as a function of 
increased  subjective  likelihood  in  negative  episodic  counterfactual  thoughts  is  also 
noteworthy.  This  result  appears  inconsistent  with  Weiler  et  al’s  (2010)  parametric 
modulation  of  occurrence  probability  in  episodic  future  thinking.  They  reported  a 
decrease in activity in right hippocampus, correlated with increase subjective likelihood, 
in a cluster peaking within ~4 mm of the cluster’s peak reported here. In their paper, 
Weiler  and  colleagues  interpret  their  result  as  suggesting  that  the  decrease  in  right 
hippocampal  activity—strongly  associated  with  binding  of  novel  associations  during 
episodic simulation (see Addis & Schacter, 2012, and Schacter & Addis, 2009, for a 
review)— may reflect a higher demand during the binding of imagined future probable 
events relative to improbable events; since the former tend to be more similar to past 
events, they may require less episodic recombination as their components are usually 
experienced  together.  However,  there  are  reasons  to  believe  that  neither  the  result 
reported here, nor our interpretation of it, is actually inconsistent with Weiler et al’s 
result. For one, they explored hippocampal activity during event elaboration, not during 
event construction, as the current study does. It may be that the right hippocampus is   37 
differentially  responsive  to  likelihood  during  these  difference  phases  of  simulation. 
Second,  their  study  did  not  differentiate  between  emotionally  positive  and  negative 
episodic future thoughts, while here we link right hippocampal activity specifically to 
negative counterfactual thoughts. Although further research is needed to pin down the 
differential  contributions  of  the  hippocampus  to  both  downward  and  upward 
counterfactual thinking, it is possible that the modulation of hippocampal activity by 
likely counterfactuals we found in the current study is actually driven by the kind of 
emotion  associated  to  the  simulation,  rather  than  the  mere  experience  of  subjective 
probability.  
   
5. Conclusion. 
    Consistent with previous studies, our results suggest that episodic counterfactual 
thinking engages many of the same brain regions that form the core network recruited 
during episodic autobiographical recollection. In addition, several of the recruited areas 
were differentially modulated by the participant’s own perception of how likely it is that 
a certain event could have occurred in a particular way. Moreover, our analysis also 
revealed that there is more overlap between the neural regions associated with episodic 
recollection and likely episodic counterfactual thoughts than with counterfactual thoughts 
considered unlikely. Taken together, these results suggest that similar cognitive processes 
may support episodic counterfactual thinking and episodic autobiographical recollection, 
particularly when counterfactual thinking is realistic. In accordance with the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis, our results partially support the claim that activity in the 
hippocampus and adjacent medial temporal areas, as well as medial and lateral frontal   38 
regions,  may  reflect  the  increased  involvement  of  recombinatory  processes  in  the 
construction of unlikely episodic counterfactual thoughts. However, the large overlap in 
activation between unlikely counterfactuals and the control condition makes it difficult to 
draw  strong  conclusions  about  the  precise  process  associated  with  such  activations. 
Nonetheless, taken together, our results are consistent with recent work on episodic future 
thinking,  indicating  that  episodic  memory  not  only  provides  the  informational 
components of our thoughts about what happened in the past but also about what may 
happen in the future and what might have happened in the past. Exploring the constraints 
imposed by episodic memory to our thoughts about what may happen in the future and 
what may have happened in the past offers a rich avenue for future research.   39 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Experimental design. A screen with three episodic components (i.e., context, 
action/event,  and  outcome)  and  the  specific  condition  as  title  (e.g.,  Positive)  was 
presented to the participants for 10s. Participants were asked to press a button as soon as 
the construction period had finished (aproximately 4 to 5 seconds; see results), and were 
instructed to elaborate on their simulation for the remaing time. After a fixation cross, 
screens with the ratings of emotion and vividness, and then likelihood and regret/relief, 
were  presented  for  6  seconds  each.  Participants  used  a  five-button  MRI  compatible 
response box to record their ratings. A final fixation cross indicated the end of the trial 
and beginning of next trial.    
 
Figure 2. Latent variable 1 (LV 1). (A) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals. Of 
note,  confidence  intervals  are  asymmetrical  as  a  result  of  rescaling  each  condition’s 
distribution during bootstraping. (B) Plot of temporal brain scores indicating weighted 
average of activation across all voxels in all subjects during the length of the task (TRs = 
2  seconds)  across  all  voxels  in  all  subjects.  (C)  Brain  regions  associated  with  the 
experimental conditions at selected TRs. All regions are shown at a threshold of p <.001. 
(D) Plots indicating percent signal change of peak voxels in right parahippocampal gyrus 
(BA 28; xyz = 24 -22 -8), left posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23; xyz = -4 -32 22), and 
left superior parietal lobule (BA 7; xyz = -30 -70 52). 
 
Figure 3. Latent variable 2 (LV 2). (A) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals. Of 
note,  confidence  intervals  are  asymmetrical  as  a  result  of  rescaling  each  condition’s 
distribution during bootstraping. (B) Plot of temporal brain scores indicating weighted 
average of activation across all voxels in all subjects during the length of the task (TRs = 
2  seconds)  across  all  voxels  in  all  subjects.  (C)  Brain  regions  associated  with  the 
experimental conditions at selected TRs. Brain regions associated with remember and 
likely  counterfactuals  are  shown  in  yellow,  while  those  associated  with  unlikely 
counterfactuals and the control condition are shown in cyan  All regions are shown at a 
threshold of p <.001. (D) Plots indicating percent signal change of peak voxels in left 
parahippocampal gyrus (BA 19; xyz = -18 -48 -10), right parahippocampal gyrus (BA 19; 
xyz = 26 -52 -4), and left superior frontal gyrus (BA 10; xyz = -10 60 26). 
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 Table  1:  Regions  associated  with  remember,  positive  and  negative  counterfactuals, 
versus the control condition (LV 1).  
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Note:  All  activations  are  reported  for  the  first  seven  2-second  TRs.  All  activations 
reported survive a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2). BA = approximate Brodmann 
area. L = Left; R = Right. * The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that 
voxel over its standard error. It is proportional to a z score.  
 
      MNI COORDINATES   
REGION OF ACTIVATION  HEMISPHERE  BA  X  Y  Z  BSR* 
TR 2 (2–4s after stimulus onset)             
Cerebellum  L    -18  -60  -20  -4.2757 
Posterior Cingulate  L  23  -2  -38  20  -4.2746 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  9  44  -4  28  -4.9977 
Cingulate Gyrus  R  24  24  -22  38  -4.8221 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R  28  24  -22  -8  -3.7748 
TR 3 (4–6s after stimulus onset)             
Posterior Cingulate  L  23  -4  -32  22  -4.2725 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L  38  -34  20  -38  -3.7306 
Precentral Gyrus  R  6  44  -8  26  -4.3638 
Precuneus  R  7  16  -68  40  -4.5698 
Cerebellum  R    20  -70  -46  -4.8541 
TR 4 (6-8s after stimulus onset)             
Precuneus  L  7  -8  -64  48  -4.5656 
Superior Parietal Lobule  L  7  -30  -70  52  -4.1429 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L - R  38  -40  20  -22  -4.0597 
Precentral Gyrus  R  6  40  -10  38  -3.8172 
TR 5 (8-10s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  21  -52  -34  -6  -4.5411 
Posterior Cingulate  L  29  -4  -42  14  -3.8372 
TR 6 (10-12s after stimulus onset)             
Posterior Cingulate  L  23  -2  -52  22  -5.4876 
Precuneus  L  7  -4  -68  34  -4.7842 
Superior Parietal Lobule  L  7  -34  -70  44  -3.9137 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L  38  -38  14  -22  -4.2388   49 
Table 2: Regions associated with remember and likely counterfactuals, versus unlikely 
counterfactuals and the control condition (LV 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All activations are reported for the first six 2-second TRs. All activations reported 
survive a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2). BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = 
Left; R = Right. * The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over 
its standard error. It is proportional to a z score.  
 
      MNI COORDINATES   
REGION OF ACTIVATION  HEMISPHERE  BA  X  Y  Z  BSR* 
TR 2 (2–4s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  10  -10  60  26  3.9903 
TR 3 (4-6s after stimulus onset)             
Inferior Parietal Lobe  L - R  40  -40  -56  36  4.2571 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  47  -42  36  -4  4.0301 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  9  -12  52  30  3.924 
Precuneus  R  7  20  -64  38  5.3604 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  38  34  10  -38  5.0813 
TR 4 (6-8s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  9  -14  56  32  5.0309 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -38  -62  44  3.9532 
Precuneus  R  7  4  -60  40  3.7858 
Angular Gyrus  R  39  46  -70  36  3.7283 
Superior Parietal Lobule  R  7  30  -60  44  3.6864 
TR 5 (8-10s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  9  -12  52  40  4.106 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  47  -60  24  -6  3.8246 
Precuneus  L  7  -2  -60  36  4.3333 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -42  -60  38  3.7076 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  21  -56  -4  -16  4.2505 
TR 6 (10-12s after stimulus onset)             
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L  36  -24  -18  -30  4.948 
Precuneus  L  7  -4  -60  40  4.9034 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -44  -62  40  3.8572 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus  L  21  -58  -8  -14  5.1268 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  39/22  -42  -64  30  4.0254   50 
Table 3: Regions associated with unlikely and the control condition, versus remember 
and likely counterfactuals (LV 2).  
 
      MNI COORDINATES   
REGION OF ACTIVATION  HEMISPHERE  BA  X  Y  Z  BSR* 
TR 2 (2–4s after stimulus onset)             
Cingulate Gyrus  L  24  -14  4  38  -3.7572 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  47  28  30  4  -4.2578 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  R  8/9  12  48  54  -4.1301 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R  46  52  30  28  -3.8343 
Putamen  R    32  -14  8  -5.4074 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  22  46  -26  -8  -5.5013 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  R  21  62  0  -16  -3.8053 
TR 3 (4-6s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  6  -6  28  68  -3.8342 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  10  -28  46  16  -3.7966 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L  30  -26  -54  2  -5.5633 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L  19  -18  -48  -10  -4.7548 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -60  -44  42  -5.8973 
Claustrum  L - R    -30  14  8  -5.743 
Insula  L  13  -58  -36  18  -5.0082 
Caudate  L    -10  6  22  -4.2916 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  22  -48  -38  6  -5.0794 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  45  60  14  20  -4.2282 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R  27  24  -36  -4  -5.9839 
Postcentral Gyrus  R  3  34  -26  46  -4.9942 
Thalamus  R    30  -32  6  -4.6507 
Hypothalamus  R    6  -6  -12  -4.5517 
TR 4 (6-8s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  11  -26  48  -12  -5.3128 
Precentral Gyrus  L - R  6  -38  -6  44  -4.3725 
Anterior Cingulate  L - R  32  -14  22  26  -5.3403 
Posterior Cingulate  L  29  -16  -44  6  -3.7754 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -58  -34  20  -3.6406 
Putamen  L    -28  2  8  -4.4758 
Medial Frontal Gyrus  R  25  10  22  -18  -4.4895 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  9  60  8  32  -4.0269 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R  19  26  -52  -4  -3.6186 
Lingual Gyrus  R  19  24  -62  0  -3.9523 
Thalamus  R    12  -38  8  -3.8167 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  42/38  70  -20  6  -5.5658 
TR 5 (8-10s after stimulus onset)               51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All activations are reported for the first six 2-second TRs. All activations reported 
survive a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2). BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = 
Left; R = Right. * The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over 
its standard error. It is proportional to a z score.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Precentral Gyrus  L  6  -54  0  36  -5.1143 
Cingulate Gyrus  L - R  32/31  -10  10  36  -4.4315 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  8  -36  24  46  -3.6352 
Postcentral Gyrus  L  4  -58  -32  20  -4.7878 
Postcentral Gyrus  L - R  3  -22  -36  56  -4.5936 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R  10  44  48  18  -3.6474 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  38  60  14  -10  -4.3752 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  R  21  66  -28  -2  -3.6201 
TR 6 (10-12s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L - R  10  -42  48  12  -4.1832 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  9  -36  40  36  -3.9937 
Cingulate Gyrus  L  31  -12  -36  42  -4.6973 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -60  -30  36  -4.944 
Precuneus  L - R  7  -26  -50  52  -3.6877 
Precentral Gyrus  R  44  52  8  10  -4.0911 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R  19  18  -54  -4  -5.0394 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  R  20/21  50  -36  -10  -4.2747 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  38  52  18  -16  -3.5878   52 
Table 4: Regions of activation revealed by the parametric modulation analysis. 
 
      MNI COORDINATES   
REGION OF ACTIVATION  HEMISPHERE  BA  X  Y  Z  T-VALUE 
A. Regions showing increasing activation modulated by subjective likelihood 
Positive Counterfactuals             
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  46  -44  38  4  3.44 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  10  -36  58  8  3.36 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus  L  20  -50  -24  -18  3.67 
Negative Counterfactuals             
Precentral Gyrus  L - R  6  -46  -12  28  3.27 
Anterior Cingulate  L  32/24  -6  40  8  3.42 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L  30  -24  -38  6  3.15 
Insula  L  13  -40  -18  4  3.51 
Thalamus  L - R    -22  -30  6  3.18 
Caudate  L – R    -10  -6  20  2.87 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L  22  -58  -36  10  3 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L – R  38  -40  12  -28  2.84 
Middle Frontal Gyrus  R  9/46  48  16  30  2.8 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  47  22  12  -16  2.79 
Hippocampus  R    34  -10  -16  2.76 
Peripheral Counterfactuals             
Posterior Cingulate  L  23  -2  -56  18  3.09 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L  19  -40  -52  -2  2.75 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  19  -32  -60  14  3.47 
Cuneus  L  17  -22  -78  0  3.34 
Lingual Gyrus  L  18  -14  -80  -4  2.7 
Insula  L - R  13  -34  -46  22  3.58 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  39/21  -32  -54  22  3.47 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L - R  22  -62  -16  0  3.12 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  37  -40  -62  -4  2.78 
Caudate      32  -42  10  2.87 
B.  Regions showing decreasing activation modulated by subjective likelihood 
Positive Counterfactuals             
Cerebellum  L    -2  -44  -50  6.39 
Caudate  L    -10  26  -6  4.22 
Thalamus  L - R    -4  -16  6  3.76 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R  35  16  -22  -16  5.08 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  42  2  -8  2  6.67 
Negative Counterfactuals             
Middle Temporal/Angular Gyrus  L  39  -50  -72  30  4.11 
Precuneus  R  7  6  -78  48  4.09   53 
 
 
 
Note: All activations reported survived a threshold of p < .005, k = 10. BA = approximate 
Brodmann Area. L = Left; R = Right. 
Peripheral Counterfactuals             
Postcentral Gyrus  L  1  -50  -28  56  4.19 
Superior Frontal Gyrus  R  6  20  2  66  3.48 
Cerebellum  R    2  -42  -12  4.82   54 
 
Figure 1  55 
 
 
Figure 2  56 
 
 
Figure 3   57 
Table 5 (Supplementary material): Regions associated with remember, likely, and 
unlikely counterfactuals versus the control condition (LV 3). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All activations are reported for the first six 2-second TRs. All activations reported 
survive a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2). BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = 
Left; R = Right. * The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over 
its standard error. It is proportional to a z score.  
 
      MNI COORDINATES   
REGION OF ACTIVATION  HEMISPHERE  BA  X  Y  Z  BSR* 
TR 2 (2–4s after stimulus onset)             
Posterior Cingulate  L  23  -2  -34  20  4.4041 
Thalamus  L    0  -20  6  4.9773 
Medial Frontal/Precentral gyrus  R  6  6  -10  54  4.4198 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R  28  24  -20  -10  3.6014 
Caudate  R    22  -14  22  3.5777 
TR 3 (4-6s after stimulus onset)             
Posterior Cingulate  L  23  0  -32  22  4.4206 
Precuneus  L - R  7  0  -64  40  3.7845 
Middle Temporal Gyrus  L  37  -42  -56  -6  5.4421 
Middle Temporal/Temporal Pole  L - R  21/22  -56  2  -10  3.8429 
Precentral Gyrus  R  6  44  -8  26  4.1039 
Cingulate gyrus  R  24  4  -14  44  4.5066 
Hippocampus  R    34  -28  -10  3.7142 
Thalamus  R    22  -28  10  5.1408 
TR 4 (6-8s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Temporal Gyrus/Precuneus  L  7  -4  -64  50  3.9015 
Middle Temporal/Temporal Pole  L  21  -56  -30  -2  4.0394 
TR 5 (8-10s after stimulus onset)             
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  47  -56  32  -12  3.9543 
Posterior Cingulate  L  29  -4  -40  16  5.1475 
Precuneus  L  7  -2  -78  34  4.1333 
Middle /Inferior Temporal Gyrus  L  21  -52  -34  -6  4.4684 
TR 6 (10-12s after stimulus onset)             
Posterior Cingulate  L  29  0  -42  18  3.6953 
Precuneus  L - R  7  0  -66  34  5.3233 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -46  -58  34  4.5137   58 
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Figure 4. Latent variable 3 (LV 3). (A) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals. Of 
note,  confidence  intervals  are  asymmetrical  as  a  result  of  rescaling  each  condition’s 
distribution during bootstraping. (B) Plot of temporal brain scores indicating weighted 
average of activation across all voxels in all subjects during the length of the task (TRs = 
2  seconds)  across  all  voxels  in  all  subjects.  (C)  Brain  regions  associated  with  the 
experimental conditions at selected TRs. Brain regions associated with remember and 
likely  counterfactuals  are  shown  in  yellow;  brain  regions  associated  with  unlikely 
counterfactuals and the control condition are shown in cyan  All regions are shown at a 
threshold of p <.001. (D) Plots indicating percent signal change of peak voxels in right 
parahippocampal gyrus (BA 28; xyz = 24 -20 -10), right hippocampus (xyz = 34 -28 -10), 
and left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47; xyz = -56 32 -12).   59 
Table 6. (Supplementary material). Regions associated with remembering and likely 
counterfactuals versus unlikely counterfactuals (LV 4) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All activations are reported for the first six 2-second TRs. All activations reported 
survive a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2). BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = 
Left; R = Right. * The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over 
its standard error. It is proportional to a z score. + Indicates regions that were not 
identified in LV 2 but showed activation in LV 4. 
 
      MNI COORDINATES   
REGION OF ACTIVATION  HEMISPHERE  BA  X  Y  Z  BSR* 
TR 2 (2–4s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  10  -10  60  28  5.191 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus +  L  45  -54  20  10  3.972 
Superior Temporal Gyrus +  L  22  -54  16  -2  3.76 
Middle Temporal Gyrus +  L  19  -38  -82  22  4.911 
Middle Frontal Gyrus +  R  8/6  40   2  64  6.607 
TR 3 (4-6s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  47  -44  34  -4  4.348 
Middle Temporal Gyrus +  L  19  -40  -80  20  4.211 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L - R  40  -42  -54  -40  4.646 
TR 4 (6-8s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  9  -18  62  36  3.689 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus +  L  46/47  -48  30  14  4.351 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -40  -58  38  4.064 
Cerebellum +  L    -22  -70  -42  4.212 
Parahippocampal Gyrus +  R  34  12  -12  -28  3.793 
TR 5 (8-10s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  9  -16  54  32  4.615 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  L  46  -46  26  16  3.736 
TR 6 (10-12s after stimulus onset)             
Medial Frontal Gyrus +  L  8  -16  32  50  4.2429 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus  L  21  -58  -10  -16  6.206 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L  35  -26  -12  -28  6.134 
Caudate +  L    -12  24  14  3.708 
Cerebellum +  L    -16  -36  -36  4.584 
Medial Frontal Gyrus +  R  10  8  66  4  3.880   60 
Table 7. (Supplementary material). Regions associated with unlikely counterfactuals 
versus remembering and likely counterfactuals (LV 4). 
 
  
      MNI COORDINATES   
REGION OF ACTIVATION  HEMISPHERE  BA  X  Y  Z  BSR* 
TR 2 (2–4s after stimulus onset)             
Superior Frontal Gyrus  L  8  -6  44  56  -3.741 
Superior/Middle Temporal Gyrus  L – R  21  -62  -32  -16  -3.739 
Cingulate Gyrus  L  24  -6  -4  42  -5.3796 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  45  62  26  6  -3.772 
Putamen  R  38  32  -14  8  -4.219 
Fusiform Gyrus +  R  37  32  -38  -18  -4.834 
Superior Temporal Gyrus +  R  38  48  16  -36  -3.872 
Insula +  R  40  50  -24  14  -5.302 
Thalamus +  R    20  -34  0  -7.358 
TR 3 (4-6s after stimulus onset)             
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -60  -42  38  -5.203 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  L - R  30  -28  -52  0  -5.210 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  L  41/42  -46  -40  8  -6.581 
Insula  L - R  13  -28  -40  26  -4.083 
Claustrum  L    -32  10  6  -4.914 
Cerebellum  L - R    -14  -44  -8  -5.205 
Fusiform Gyrus +  R  37  48  -36  -12  -4.013 
Postcentral Gyrus  R  2  38  -28  46  -6.057 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  22  68  -20  2  -4.421 
TR 4 (6-8s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  9  -34  26  34  -4.26 
Precentral Gyrus  L  6  -24  -16  58  -4.725 
Inferior Parietal Lobule +  L  40  -40  -32  44  -4.324 
Postcentral Gyrus  L  40  -58  -30  20  -4.767 
Parahippocampal Gyrus +  L  30  -28  -58  4  -4.861 
Putamen  L    -30  -2  8  -4.230 
Cerebellum +  L - R    0  -54  -42  -3.795 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  44  62  8  20  -4.145 
Postcentral Gyrus +  R  3  36  -30  50  -4.033 
Cingulate Gyrus  R  24/32  10  12  44  -6.320 
Parahippocampal Gyrus  R  18  28  -60  2  -5.583 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  22/38  64  -22  4  -5.023 
TR 5 (8-10s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L  6  -26  -10  54  3.983 
Precentral Gyrus  L  6  -40  -6  42  -4.556 
Postcentral Gyrus  L - R  2  -52  -30  44  -5.250   61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All activations are reported for the first six 2-second TRs. All activations reported 
survive a threshold of p < .0002 (BSR = 3.2). BA = approximate Brodmann area. L = 
Left; R = Right. * The bootstrap ratio (BSR) is the parameter estimate for that voxel over 
its standard error. It is proportional to a z score. + Indicates regions that were not 
identified in LV 2 but showed activation in LV 4. 
 
 
 
Postcentral Gyrus  L  3  -58  -18  30  -4.849 
Cingulate Gyrus  L - R  24  -4  14  32  -5.233 
Inferior Parietal Lobule +  L  40  -38  -36  44  -4.127 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  21/22  66  -24  -2  -4.619 
Cerebellum +  R    22  -38  -14  -4.359 
TR 6 (10-12s after stimulus onset)             
Middle Frontal Gyrus  L - R  10  -40  48  14  -3.698 
Inferior Parietal Lobule  L  40  -58  -32  24  -4.205 
Postcentral Gyrus  R  7  8  -54  76  -4.018 
Cingulate Gyrus  R  32  4  10  44  -4.286 
Superior Temporal Gyrus  R  41  56  -28  12  -4.205 
Lingual Gyrus  R  19  16  -52  -4  -6.116 
Hippocampus +  R    36  -22  -10  -4.065 
Thalamus +  R    18  -36  0  -4.404   62 
	 ﾠ
 
Figure 5. Latent variable 3 (LV 4). (A) Plot of brain scores with confidence intervals. Of 
note,  confidence  intervals  are  asymmetrical  as  a  result  of  rescaling  each  condition’s 
distribution during bootstraping. (B) Plot of temporal brain scores indicating weighted 
average of activation across all voxels in all subjects during the length of the task (TRs = 
2  seconds)  across  all  voxels  in  all  subjects.  (C)  Brain  regions  associated  with  the 
experimental conditions at selected TRs. Brain regions associated with remember and 
likely  counterfactuals  are  shown  in  yellow;  brain  regions  associatied  with  unlikely 
counterfactuals are shown in cyan  All regions are shown at a threshold of p <.001. (D) 
Plots  indicating  percental  signal  change  of  peak  voxels  in  right  middle  frontal  gyrus 
(BA10; xyz = 8 66 4), right hippocampus (xyz = 36 -22 -10) and right postcentral gyrus 
(BA 7; xyz = 8 -54 76). 
 
 